Nebraska Law Review
Volume 53 | Issue 1

Article 8

1974

Alimony Awards under No Fault Divorce Statutes:
Magruder v. Magruder, 190 Neb. 573, 209 N.W.2d
585 (1973)
Penny Berger
University of Nebraska College of Law, pennyberger@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
Recommended Citation
Penny Berger, Alimony Awards under No Fault Divorce Statutes: Magruder v. Magruder, 190 Neb. 573, 209 N.W.2d 585 (1973), 53 Neb.
L. Rev. 126 (1974)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol53/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

Casenote

Alimony Awards Under
No Fault Divorce Statutes
Magruder v. Magruder, 190 Neb.
573, 209 N.W.2d 585 (1973).
Passage of Nebraska's new no fault divorce law' in April 1972
aroused speculation over its future application and interpretation
by the courts. The alimony provisions, 2 for example, while providing a skeletal framework for attorneys, need judicial fleshing
out before their impact will be understood. There is some question
as to whether the new law by implication eliminates marital fault
as a consideration from alimony proceedings in the same way it has
eliminated fault as a ground for granting the decree of dissolution.3 In Magruder v. Magruder4, the first case to interpret the alimony section of the new law, the court could have provided an
answer; unfortunately, it did not resolve the problem. As a result, it can only be suggested that marital fault may well still play
a role in alimony awards under Nebraska's new law. 5
1. NEB.
2.

§§ 42-347 to-379 (Supp. 1972).
When dissolution of a marriage is decreed, the court may
order payment of such alimony by one party to the other as
may be reasonable, having regard for the circumstances of the
parties, duration of the marriage, and the ability of the supported party to engage in gainful employment without interfering with the interests of any minor children in the custody
of such party ....
Except as otherwise agreed by the parties
in writing or by order of the court, alimony orders shali terminate upon the death of either party or the remarriage of
the recipient.
REV. STAT.

NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-365 (Supp. 1972).
3. According to NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-347 (Supp. 1972), the term "dis-

solution of marriage" is substituted for the traditional "divorce."
The statute requires only a finding by the court that the marriage
is "irretrievably broken" for a decree of dissolution. See also NEB.
REV. STAT. § 42-361 (Supp. 1972).
4. 190 Neb. 573, 209 N.W.2d 585 (1973).
5. The Nebraska Supreme Court soon may give a more definitive
answer to whether marital fault plays a role in alimony awards under
Nebraska's new law. In a case recently appealed to the court, Ford
v. Ford, No. 39206 (Neb., filed July 9, 1973), the attorneys for Mrs.
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The future role of fault in alimony awards remains an issue in
Nebraska for several reasons. First, no fault divorce does not logically necessitate no fault alimony. Evidence of the conduct of the
parties during the marriage can be introduced at the point of the
property settlement, at which time it would have no effect on the
decision to grant the divorce itself. in addition, Nebraska's new
no fault statute does not specifically eliminate evidence of fault
from the alimony proceedings. Using Nebraska precedent, the marital conduct of the parties could easily be a factor under the new
law's alimony provision which allows the court to order payment
"having regard for the circumstances of the parties." 6 Finally,
the problem exists because although the articulated basis of the
Magruder opinion is not one of fault, indications are that fault may
have indeed figured in the decision.
In Magruder, the plaintiff-husband originally filed suit under
Nebraska's old divorce laws;7 before any trial on the merits, however, the legislature enacted the new no fault provisions and the
action proceeded under their terms.8 This meant that the dissolution decree was granted without reference to evidence of marital
fault on the part of either spouse. At the trial, the court found
that every reasonable effort had been made to save the marriage
and entered the decree on the grounds that the union was "irretrievably broken." 9 The court divided the property equally1 9 be-

6.

7.
8.

9.

10.

Linda Ford have asked the court to rule as a matter of law that fault
is not a basis for denying alimony.
NEB.REV. STAT. § 42-365 (Supp. 1972). Adoption of a no fault divorce
law does not, of course, demand the court's complete break with
precedent; on the contrary, it remains free to follow former decisions
to the extent they do not conflict with the new law. Thus, in so far
as Nebraska's new law does not specifically eliminate marital fault
from the alimony proceedings, the court could find its continued use
appropriate for deciding issues of property settlement and child
custody. After all, the old law never required the court to consider
either fault or marital conduct but the words of the statute were interpreted by the court to include both. Eno v. Eno, 159 Neb. 1, 65
N.W.2d 145 (1954); Ristow v. Ristow, 152 Neb. 615, 41 N.W.2d 924
(1950); Swolec v. Swolec, 122 Neb. 837, 241 N.W. 771 (1932).
Neb. Laws c. 16, § 1 et seq. (1866) as amended.
This procedure was provided for in the new law:
Sections 42-347 to 42-379 shall apply to all pending actions
and proceedings commenced prior to July 6, 1972 with respect
to issues on which a judgment has not been entered. Pending
actions for divorce or separation shall be deemed to have been
commenced on the basis of irretrievable breakdown. ..
NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-379(2) (Supp. 1972).
"Dissolution of marriage shall mean the termination of a marriage
by decree of a court of competent jurisdiction upon finding that the
marriage is irretrievably broken. . ." NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-347(1)
(Supp. 1972).
The court was following Nebraska precedent by dividing the prop-
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tween the two spouses and granted the defendant-wife alimony of
$416.66 per month to continue until either one of the parties should
die or until Mrs. Magruder should remarry. Mrs. Magruder appealed the decision, claiming the award was inadequate; the plaintiff cross-appealed, declaring that the award was excessive and
should not have been granted in the form of a lifetime annuity.
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Nebraska, the decree was
modified to award the defendant "monthly alimony in the amount
of $833.33 for a period of ten years and two months."" The award
was to terminate earlier if either party should die or Mrs. Magruder
should remarry. The court stated that while the "defendant should
receive monthly alimony for a shorter period of time [than had
been allowed by the original award], . . . the present value of
the award should be an amount
approximately equivalent to that
2
made by the trial court.'
The Magruder marriage represented a social pattern that is becoming both more common and more commonly recognized. The
parties were married in 1962 when the plaintiff was 22 and the
defendant 19. They were both in school-plaintiff ending a premedical course of study and defendant attending college half-days.
Both parties worked with the defendant contributing the bulk of
their funds. This mode of life continued while plaintiff finished
medical school and defendant acquired a master's degree in addition to her undergraduate diploma. While the plaintiff was in
medical school, the couple continued to live largely on the defendant's teaching salary; most of their property was obtained with the
aid of her parents. After plaintiff's graduation from medical school,
and until the present action, his earnings supported the marriage.
At the time of the trial, the couple was childless; plaintiff was 32,
defendant 29.
Writing for the majority, Judge Clinton set the tone of the opinion at the outset-a sense of continuity with the past. Looking at
the trial court's alimony award in light of the new statute on
spousal support, the judge found that, as with prior decisions under
the old law, the amount of the award must be measured under a
erty equally between the parties. While the court has often stated
that there are no hard and fast rules for division of the property in
divorce cases, it consistently has used a figure of between % and %
as a judicial rule of thumb. See Junker v. Junker, 188 Neb. 555,
198 N.W.2d 189 (1972); Kula v. Kula, 181 Neb. 531, 149 N.W.2d 430
(1967); Loukota v. Loukota, 177 Neb. 355, 128 N.W.2d 809 (1964);
Dwinnell v. Dwinnell, 165 Neb. 566, 86 N.W.2d 579 (1957). The
supreme court did not modify this part of the original Magruder
decision.
11. 190 Neb. at 578, 209 N.W.2d at 588.
12. Id. at 577, 209 N.W.2d at 588.
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standard of "reasonableness."1 3 He interpreted reasonableness as
requiring the court to note "all the circumstances of the parties, as
well as the duration of the marriage and the ability of the supported
party to engage in gainful employment without interfering with the
interests of any minor children of the parties in the supported
party's custody."'14 He was quoting elements listed by the new
law for the court to weigh in granting alimony. 15 By opening the
case with this discussion, the court linked the new law to precedent,
raising the possibility of those links extending to inclusion of marital conduct as an element in the alimony award.
Judge Clinton devoted only one paragraph to the size of the
award, raising more questions than answers.' 6 The decision seems
to be based on what might be labeled the "investment theory" of
marital contribution. This approach to the problem of property
settlements and awards of spousal support stems from the idea that
a woman' 7 who contributes to her husband's education has invested
in his future. This is particularly true where the choice results
from a joint determination that both spouses will benefit from the
husband's increased earning power and social status. Often the
choice entails a positive sacrifice on the part of the wife; at the
very least, it narrows her field of options. In such a situation, the
wife deserves upon divorce to realize at least a portion of her investment. She deserves more than the mere return, dollar for
dollar, of the wages or other property she contributed to the marriage. She has earned the right to some part of her ex-husband's
future earnings since they were made possible partly through her
efforts and since her choice of life-style during marriage was based
on the assumption that she would also share in his future standard
of living. Had she put her money into a different form of investment, she could have realized both interest and possible capital

gains.
To be sure, this investment theory does not represent a completely new view of the problems of equitable alimony awards.
In fact, a line of cases decided under the original divorce statutes
in Nebraska adopted this very rationale; the leading one, Prosser
v. Prosser'8 is a case much like Magruderin its factual pattern. In
Prosser, the court was also faced with a wife who worked to send
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 576, 209 N.W.2d at 587.
Id. at 577, 209 N.W.2d at 587.
See note 2 supra.
190 Neb. at 577-78, 209 N.W.2d at 588.
This portion of the article has used sexual references which fit the
majority of cases. It is understood of course, that the sexual roles
could be reversed in any given case.
18. 156 Neb. 629, 57 N.W.2d 173 (1953).
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her husband through school in order to ensure both a higher standard of living in the future. Not only did she contribute the earnings the couple lived on during the husband's years at the university, but she also helped him in his class preparations and aided him
in his job as a grading assistant. In addition, the wife gave up her
seniority rights with her employer when they moved to the town
in which the husband had purchased a business interest. As in the
Magruder case, the divorce occurred just as the husband's salary
began to bear the fruit of their joint labors. The court in Prosser
stated:
It is clear that plaintiff [the wife] made a large investment in
defendant's future, with the thought no doubt that it was of joint
interest to the future of both ....

We point out that this wife

had a right to expect that in the years to come she would share
in the benefits derived from the training and ability of the
defendant, which she literally helped to bring about. 19
After using the investment theory rationale, however, the Prosser court went on to consider the comparative marital fault of the
parties. 20 While it is impossible to determine the relative importance to the decision of either element with any precision, the presence of the fault discussion weakens the strength of the investment
theory. Still, the investment theory need not depend on the finding of fault but can and should stand on its own validity. At least
some of the language in the Magruder opinion supports this view,
for Judge Clinton pointed out:
[Tlhe marriage did endure for about 9 years and during that
time the defendant made substantial contributions to the future
economic well-being of the parties. The parties at the time of
the separation had just reached the point where they
would begin
21
to reap some of the economic rewards of their efforts.
Throughout its discussion of Mrs. Magruder's contribution to the
marriage, the court justified the alimony award with a rationale
capable of existing independently of fault considerations. The court
muddied the waters, however, by observing, "The defendant
19. 156 Neb. at 632, 57 N.W2d at 175.
20.
In determining the amount of alimony to be awarded in the
present case the relative or comparative fault of the parties
is a material element. The age of the parties and the duration of the marriage have evidential value. The social standing, comforts, and luxuries of life which the wife probably
would have enjoyed are to be weighed in fixing the amount.
The earnings of the husband and his ability to earn are particularly important in this case when viewed in the light of
the contributions made thereto by the wife. We cannot overlook the fact that defendant has seen fit to treat the marriage
as a matter of convenience to be cast aside when the material
fruits have been realized.
156 Neb. at 634, 57 N.W.2d at 176.
21. 190 Neb. at 577, 209 N.W.2d at 5688.
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would have liked to have had the marriage continue. These contributions [i.e., the wife's investment in her husband's future and
her unwillingness to see the marriage ended] lead us to believe
that the alimony awarded the defendant should be substantial
.
*...
22 The net result of the court's approach is confusion; it
is impossible to tell whether the words "the defendant would have
liked to have had the marriage continue" were a comment on the
extent of Mrs. Magruder's economic frustrations or whether they
signified some element of fault in the court's decision.
Although the majority never addressed the fault issue, Chief
Justice White, joined by two other dissenters, did interpret the majority's action as applying "sub silentio . .. the harsh and punitive considerations present in the traditional picture of a lifetime
marriage, with family and children, in many of the cases citet [sic]
23
by the court prior to the enactment of the 'no fault' divorce law.1
24
The chief justice's opposition to what he perceived to be the
basis of the majority decision is predicated on the assumption that
no fault divorce necessarily means no fault alimony as well. Although Chief Justice White treated the issue as settled, in fact, the
role of fault in alimony awards under no fault divorce laws is a
subject of lively debate. The chief justice reinforced his position
with experiences of courts in four other no fault jurisdictions: Florida, Oregon, California and Iowa. An examination of the cases cited
22. Id. at 577, 209 N.W.2d at 588. It is also clear from the way Judge
Clinton set out the facts of the case that evidence of the parties' conduct during marriage was introduced and a reading of the attorneys'
briefs confirms this.
23. Id. at 578, 209 N.W.2d at 588.
24. Chief Justice White contended that the court should confine its attention to
two broad factors in determining alimony: Social surroundings and the ability to help oneself. Social surroundings includes the length of the marriage and present health and age.
The ability to help oneself includes amount of assets, ability
to obtain employment, and the size of the income of the supporting spouse.
Id. at 584, 209 N.W.2d at 591 (citation omitted). Chief Justice White
feared that if the court looked beyond these particular elements,
awards would create "alimony drone [s] "-women who live in a state
of "secured indolence" on the earnings of ex-husbands while perfectly
capable of supporting themselves. Id. at 584, 209 N.W.2d at 591. This
threat of the alimony drone, however, is chimerical; in truth, abuses
of alimony are in a minority. The major problem has been the
inability of the courts to award and the inability of many ex-spouses
to pay sufficient alimony to provide adequate support. H. CLARx,
LAW OF DomEsTIc RELATIONS § 14.1 at 422 (1968).
An interim study

committee of the Nebraska Legislature heard testimony on this and
other economic problems faced by women under the divorce law
during October 1973.
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by White, however, gives a somewhat different impression than
left by the dissent. First, fault has not been completely eliminated
from alimony proceedings in other no fault jurisdictions. And second, in one state where the court did feel compelled to this result,
it safeguarded the interests of possibly injured spouses in other
ways.
Chief Justice White first cited tl:e case interpreting the Florida
statute.25 In Lefler v. Lefler,26 the trial court awarded the plaintiffhusband his wife's interest in their home and personal belongings
as alimony. The Florida Supreme Court decision is quite short and,
like Magruder, ignored the question of whether alimony under the
new law would be determined without regard to fault. The trial
court was reversed because the husband could show neither entitlement nor need for the award. Given those determinations, the
husband could not pass the threshold tests for alimony and the court
found it unnecessary to consider fault; fault alone after all has
never justified a grant of spousal support. Thus, while the Florida
court eventually may decide that marital fault must not figure in
property and alimony awards, the conclusion
seems unwarranted
27
that it has done so in the Lefler decision.
The chief justice also quoted with approval the Iowa Supreme
Court's statement that
[t]he intent and purpose [of Iowa's no fault divorce statute] was
to eliminate the fault concept as a standard for granting dissolution of the marital relationship and . . . not only the "guilty
party" concept must be eliminated as a factor but evidence of
the conduct of the parties insofar as it tends to place fault for
the marriage breakdown on either spouse must also be rejected
25.

(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court
may grant alimony to either party ....
The court may consider the adultery of a spouse and the circumstances thereof
in determining whether alimony shall be awarded to such
spouse and the amount of alimony, if any, to be awarded to
such spouse.
(2) In determining a proper award of alimony, the court
may consider any factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08 (Supp. 1972).
26. 264 So. 2d 112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
27. It also should be noted that the Florida statute gives the court the
discretion to consider "any factor necessary to do equity and justice
between the parties." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08 (2) (Supp. 1972) (emphasis added). In light of the Florida court's statement that "alimony['s] . . . basic nature and purpose remains the same [under the
new law]," 264 So. 2d at 113, and the fact that Florida's statute does
not specifically eliminate the use of fault, it seems reasonable that
the court could decide to consider fault when necessary to do justice
between the parties just as it did before.
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as a factor in awarding property settlement or an allowance of
alimony or support money. 28

This language seems to indicate Iowa's total rejection of all considerations of conduct in alimony proceedings. However, an examination of Iowa law shows that the parties' conduct is still a factor in Iowa alimony decisions. Traditionally, the court in Iowa,
as in Nebraska, has defined the bases for alimony awards. Unlike
the situation in Nebraska, however, Iowa's new divorce law29 does
not list any guidelines. Thus, Iowa courts have complete freedom
to determine alimony and property settlement standards themselves.
The leading Iowa case on the standards to be used is Schantz v.
Schantz30 where in 1968 the Iowa Supreme Court itemized a list of
fifteen pre- and post-marital criteria for determining alimony and
32
property settlements. 31 In In re Marriage of Harrington,
the Iowa
Supreme Court held that after passage of the dissolution of marriage law, Schantz's fourth post-marital criteria-"conduct of the

28. In re Marriage of Tjaden, 199 N.W.2d 475, 477, referring to In re Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1972).
29. "When a dissolution of marriage is decreed, the court may make
such order in relation to the children, property, parties, and the
maintenance of the parties as shall be justified." IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 598.21 (Supp. 1972).
30. 163 N.W.2d 398 (Iowa 1968).
31. A. PREMARITAL CRITERIA:
1. Social position and living standards of each party.
2. Their respective ages.
3. Their respective mental or physical condition.
4. What each sacrificed or contributed, financially or otherwise, to the marriage.
5. The training, education and abilities of each party.
B. POSTMARITAL CRITERIA:
1. Duration of the marriage.
2. Number of children, their respective ages, physical or
mental conditions, and relative parental as opposed to financial needs.
3. Net worth of property acquired, contributions of each
party therto by labor or otherwise, net worth and present
income of each party.
4. Conduct of the spouses and particularly that of the guilty
party.
5. Present physical and mental health of each party.
6. Earning capacity of each party.
7. Life expectancy of each party.
8. Any extraordinary sacrifice, devotion or care by either
spouse in furtherance of a happy marriage or in preservation of the martial relationship.
9. Present standards of living and ability of one party to
pay balanced against relative needs of the other.
10. Any other relevant factors which will aid in reaching a
fair and equitable determination as to respective rights
and obligations of the parties.
Id. at 405.
32. 199 N.W.2d 351 (Iowa 1972).

134

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 53, NO. 1 (1974)

83
spouses and particularly that of the guilty party"-was eliminated.
Yet, cases indicate that Schantz's eighth post-marital criterion-"any
extraordinary sacrifice, devotion or care by either spouse in furtherance of a happy marriage or in preservation of the marital relationship"-is still intact in Iowa. In Harrington,for example, the court
indicated it was considering the eighth criteria in determining the
wife's alimony and property settlement.8 4 And Justice Reynoldson,
dissenting in In re Wifliams, 35 called attention to the fact that retention of the eighth criteria makes it "clear that evidence of good
conduct is invited" in Iowa alimony proceedings. 30 Thus, it appears
that although Iowa has eliminated evidence of fault as a factor in
alimony proceedings, some evidence of a spouse's conduct is allowed, and the remaining Schantz criteria protect the interests of
the party seeking spousal support in the absence of a fault standard. The detailed Schantz criteria used in Iowa alimony proceedings should be compared with the two factors which Chief Justice
37
White suggested should be considered in Nebraska.

The chief justice mentioned only two other decisions in the dissent, one each from Oregon and California. 38 In each of these cases,
however, the court operated within a different statutory context
than that in Nebraska where the law is silent on the role of fault.
The Oregon statute specifically eliminates fault as a consideration
in alimony.3 9 In California, while the section of the statute on
spousal support is silent on the role of fault, the statute explicitly
rejects fault from the divorce proceedings in general. This specific statutory rejection of fault can be seen to apply to alimony hearings.40 The breadth of these prohibitions is illustrated by both
state statutes allowing an exception to the general rejection of
fault where child custody is at issue. By thus circumscribing the
33. Id. at 354.
34. In discussing the factors it considered in making its award, the court
stated: "The fact that she [defendant-wife] contributed to a happy
marriage for ten years both by her labor and attention cannot be
denied under this record." Id. at 355.
35. 199 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1972).
36. Id. at 351.
37. See note 24 supra.
38. In re Marriage of Rosan, 24 Cal. App. 3d 885, 101 Cal. Rptr. 295 (1972);
Minovsky v. Minovsky, 500 P.2d 1234 (Ore. App. 1972).

39.

(1) The doctrines of fault and of in pani delicto are abolished
in suits for the annulment or dissolution of a marriage.
(2) The court shall not receive evidence of specific acts of
misconduct, excepting where child custody is an issue and
such evidence is relevant to that issue, or excepting at a hearing when the court finds such evidence necessary to provide
irreconcilable differences.
ORE. REV. STAT. § 107.036 (Supp. 1971).
40.
In any pleadings or proceedings for legal separation or dis-
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role of fault, the Oregon and California legislatures have given
notice that they have considered the fault issue and have decided to
limit its application in this way.
It seems that Chief Jutice White based his conclusions about the
role of fault in the Magruder majority decision largely on the
amount of the award. He said, "I cannot come to any other conclusion but that the alimony award in this case is grossly excessive and
is not harmonious with the present statute operating the 'no fault'
provisions for the dissolution of a marriage."41 Without an empirical study, however, there is no way of knowing if the size of the
award is evidence that fault played a role in the court's determination. Without objective support, this assertion remains essentially
conjecture.
The issue placed in contention by Chief Justice White, i.e., the
role of fault in the award of spousal support under a no fault divorce
law, is important regardless of the correctness of his analysis of
the Magruder majority opinion. Despite the impression given by
the dissent, legal scholars, practicing attorneys and experts in family relations disagree on solutions to the problem. 42
Those who argue against permitting a fault element in the alimony proceedings contend that to do so would subvert the principle
of no fault divorce. First, fault allowed at any time during a divorce
trial would re-introduce the hostility and exacerbate the tensions
which the no fault system is designed to eliminate. Second, since
in most divorces, the marriage breaks down due to complex social
and psychological reasons, the idea that one party alone is at fault
is unrealistic and should not influence the property arrangements.
Other parties however, claim there is no reason to reject evidence
of marital conduct once the decision has been made to grant the
dissolution. They argue that the no fault divorce laws were primarily designed to cure the evil of withholding divorces from
couples whose marriages are no longer workable-not the problems
attendant upon property settlements. Critics of a strictly no fault
system point out that one spouse may very well suffer real damage,
solution of marriage under this part ... evidence of specific
acts of misconduct shall be improper and inadmissible, except
where child custody is in issue and such evidence is relevant
to that issue, or at the hearing where it is determined by the
court to be necessary to establish the existence of irreconcilable differences.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4509 (West 1970).
41. 109 Neb. at 578, 209 N.W.2d at 588.
42. See, e.g., Clark, Divorce Policy and Divorce Reform, 42 COLO. L REv.
403 (1971); Kay, Book Review, 60 CA=. L. REv. 168a (1973); Note,
Does No-Fault Divorce Portend No-Fault Alimony?, 34 U. Pn. L.
REv. 486 (1973).
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both physical and emotional from the conduct of the other. They
would make compensation available through alimony or other property settlements in much the same way that damages are allowed
in tort suits for pain and suffering and, in some places, for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Some critics claim the problem cannot be isolated from a concern for the status of women in
society since their social and economic status is most apt to be
affected adversely by divorce. Such critics contend it is manifestly unjust to create absolute equality in the divorce court when
soon the ex-wife will be confronted with social and practical obstacles to her attempt to maintain herself in the style which her
husband's preferred status would have assured her. A final objection to a strictly no fault system stems from the recognition that
total rejection of fault in alimony proceedings means that it cannot
be used to justify a denial of alimony either. Many people feel
that allowing alimony without regard to the conduct of the party
seeking support is terribly unfair to the spouse who will have to
pay. 43 Retaining fault as an element in alimony awards is neither
the only nor necessarily the best way of protecting injured spouses;
but it does present the easiest method given the present state of
American institutions.
CONCLUSION
Whether or not Chief Justice White is correct in his conclusions
about the role of fault in alimony awards under a no fault divorce
statute, he has performed the very important service of calling
attention to the problem. It is now incumbent upon the court to
clarify the confusion created by the Magruder decision and to devise
an equitable system of granting alimony awards that will be consistent with the new law and yet responsive to the rights and needs
of both parties.
Penny Berger '75
43. Iowa Supreme Court Justice Uhlenhopp's dissent in In re Williams,
199 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1972), expressed this particular point of view:
The question may be brought into focus by two rather extreme but not rare examples, in which all factors are equal
except the parties' conduct. In one, the husband in frequent
fits of rage visits violent physical abuse on his blameless wife
and children, eventually driving them from the home by his

cruelty. In the other, the wife carries on with a paramour,

frequently spending nights and weekends with him to the
knowledge of the blameless husband and children. Is the
court to be allowed to know these facts along with the other
equities in the case in deciding upon a fair adjustment of the
parties' financial rights and obligations? Or is the court to
function in a vacuum so far as the parties' conduct is concerned?

Id. at 349.

